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1. INTRODUCTION 
On July 1， 1997， sovereignty over Hong Kong reverted to the People's 
Republic of China (the PRC) and the former British colony became a 
Chinese special administrative region (SAR or the HKSAR). During the 
run-up to 1997， continued protection of rights under Chinese rule was a 
m司orcause for concern in the international community as well as in Hong 
Kong. Although it would be a mistake to romanticize the situation under 
British rule，1 real differences existed in law and practice between Hong Kong 
and China， and consequent1y Hong Kong people fe1t great anxiety about this 
issue， especially after the events of June 4， 1989.2 
Now， les than a year since the July 1 handover， worries over Hong 
Kong's economy have seemingly eclipsed fears of PRC infringements of 
Hong Kong people's rights. Even the foreign press has concluded血at，in 
the wake of the Asian economic downturn， the real challenges for Hong 
Kong are economic， not political. 3 China， moreover， has apparent1y adhered 
to its stated policy of non-interference in Hong Kong afairs， and any threats 
to the protection of rights have come from the HKSAR government itself. 
After a summary of the legal framework protecting rights in Hong Kong，出is
essay wil analyze the actions of the PRC and SAR governments since July 
1. Have their actions supported or undermined伽 tlegal fraIiework? How 
• Associate professor of law， U凶versityof Hawai'i School of Law. Fonn巴rlytaught at出E
U凶versityof Hong Kong， Faculty of Law (1986-199の.J.O.， Harvard; Ph.O.， Comell. 
1. Although oficialy referred to as a “teritory，" Hong Kong remained a colony， and many critics 
。fBritain's policies pointed to restrictive legislation during colonial rule. See Frank Ching， 
Misre，凶 tgHong Kong， 76 FOREIGN AFF. 53， 58-62 (May/June 1997); See， e.g.， Christine Loh， 
Hun聞 Rights-ln0 Tune陥 rp?，in刊 EUTHER HONG KONG REPORT 1996， at89， 99 (Nyaw Mee-
kau & Li Si-ming eds.， 199の.
2. When the Chinese govemment's bru飽1suppression of血epro-demωracy demonstrations in Beijing 
profoundly shocked Hong Kong people. See Johannes Chan， Huntan Rights:・FromOne Ero to 
Another， inTHE OTIlER HONG KONG REPORT 1997， at137， 139 (Joseph Y.S. Cheng ed.， 1997). 
3. See Bruce Gilley， China Ed加e，FAR E. ECON. REV.， Feb. 5， 1998， at23; Keith Richburg， 
白 njidenceRuns Low in Embattled Hong Kong， INT'L HERA印TRiB.， Jan. 23，ゆ98，at 11; Edward 
A. Gargan， Economy SI加ωHongKong Holds On to Dol，伯rIink， INT'L HERALD TRtB.， February 
3， 1998， at15. 
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泊lpO託antis the role of international rights protection in Hong Kong-has its 
importance diminished or decreased since the handover? 
1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS 
Although Hong Kong's framework for the protection of rights includes 
both international and domestic legislation， the distinction between them is 
not always clear-cut， a consequence of Hong Kong's unusual constitutional 
structure.4 First， both the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (the ICCPR)S and the International Covenant on Economic， Social and 
Cultural Rights (the ICESCR)6 have applied to Hong Kong since. Great 
Britain ratified them in 1976 and， with certain reservations， extended their 
application to its colonies.7 Second， the 1984 Sino・BritishJoint Declaration 
not only promised出at由e“provisionsof the ICCPR and the ICESCR as 
applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force" after 1997， but also provided 
for the continued protection of rights and freedoms already existing in Hong 
Kong.8 
Hong Kong's most important domestic sources of rights are the Basic 
Law and the Bil ofRights. The Basic Law，9 Hong Kong's mini-constitution， 
went into effect on July 1， 1997. It contains a broad range of rights 
(including economic and social) and introduces into domestic legislation the 
rights and freedoms granted protection by the Joint Declaration. The Basic 
Law， moreover， reiterates the Joint Declaration's promise that the 
“provisions of the ICCPR and the ICESCR as applied to Hong Kong shall 
4. Y ASH GHAl， HONG KONG'S NEW CONSTlTUTIONAL ORDER: THE REsUMPTION OF CHINESE 
SOVE阻 GNTYAND 叩 EBASIC LAW 373 (1997). See chapter 9 for a detailed analysis of恥 se
domestic and international sources of rights. 
5. See 999U.N.T.S. 171. 
6. See 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
7. See GHAl， supra note 4， at376. Since 白紙 time，Britain ratified other international covenants on 
behalf of Hong Kong， including the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel， Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment， and the Convention on the Elimination of AI1 Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women. Id. at 374. 
8. See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong， 
P問 amble~ 3(5)， Annex 1， pt. XIII， Dec. 19， 1984， U.K.-P.R.C.， [hereinafter Joint Declaration]， 
reprinted in PUBLlC LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A HONG KONG SOURCEBOOK 45 (Andrew Byrnes 
& Johannes Chan eds.， 1993) [hereinafter PUBLlC LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
9. BASIC LAW OF 百tEHONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINlSTRATIVE REGlON OF ηtE PEOPLE'S REPUBLlC OF 
CH削A(1明治1)[hereina白erBASIC LAW]， reprinted in PUBLlC LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS， supra note 
8， at84. 
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remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region." 10 
The 1991 Bil of Rights Ordinancel was adopted by the Hong Kong 
government in the wake of June 4， 1989 to provide reassurance to Hong 
Kong people that their rights would continue to receive protection a白erthe 
1997 transfer of sovereignty to China. The Bil of Rights essentially 
introduced the provisions of the ICCPR as they applied to Hong Kong 
domestic law， so its scope was therefore limited to civil and political rights. 
The drafters chose that model to ensure出elaw's survival a抗erthe 1997 
transition and to give domestic expression to those rights.12 
Together， these statutes should provide Hong Kong with a reasonable 
framework for the protection of human rights;加deed，on paper， Hong Kong 
people should have more extensive protection than ever before.13 But the 
final version of the Basic Law contains a number of controversial 
provisions，14 and its vague dra自ingstyle as well as the uncertain 
interpretation of its very general provisions may create difficulties.IS The 
Chinese government， moreover， strongly opposed the Bil of Rights from its 
enactment， arguing出atits“superior" status contravened the Basic Law. 16 
Destite objections from Hong Kong legal experts出atthe Bil of Rights 
10. ld.， art. 39. 
11. Hong Kong BilI of Rights Ordinance， LAWS OF HONG KONG， ch. 383 (1991)， reprinted in PUBUC 
LAW AND HUMAN RtGHTS， supra note 8， at218. 
12. At血esame time血eHong Kong Leters Patent were amended to entrench the ICCPR until 1uly 1， 
1997. P凶 ipDykes， 1he Hong Kong BiI of Rights 1991: lts Origin， Content and 1叩 'act，in THE 
HONG KONG BILL OF RtGHTS: A COMPARATlVE ANALYSIS 39 (10hannes Chan & Yash Ghai eds.， 
1993). 
13. See Michael C. Davis， Human Rights and the Founding ofthe Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region: A Frameworkfor Analysis， 34 COL酬 .1.TRANSNAT'LL. 301， 315 (1996); Editorial，4 
BILL OF RTS. BULL. 1 (Aug. 1997). 
14. See， e.g.， BASIC LAW， supra note 9， art. 23. Article 23 requires the HKSAR to enact laws “ω 
prohibit any act of回路on，se印 ssion，sedition， subversion against世leCen回 IPeople's Government 
or血eftof 5阻也 secrets，ωprohibitforeign politiω1 organizations or以刈iesfrom conduc也事 politica1
activities in the Region， and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of曲eRegion from 
es帥Iishingties with foreign凶iticalorganizations or bodies." ld. The Basic Law and the rights 
it creates have been exhaustively analyzed and commented upon in Hong Kong since the drafting 
pr<ぉessbeg叩 duriJ:理由ernid-eighties. For bibliographies of some of血oseworks， see GHAI， supra 
no隠 4，at 473 and PUBUC LAW AND HUMAN RtGHTS， supra note 8， at81-82. 
15. See BASIC LAw， supra note 9， art. 158. Under Article 158， the Basic Law is to be inte叩retedby 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the PRC， not by出ecourts of血E
SAR. Id. Furthermore， the Basic Law， which is a Chinese statute. is drafted in a more general 
style. 
16. The BiI of Righ臼 hasalso received an exhaustive treatment in Hong Kong legal writings. For 
bibliographies of some of those works， see GHAI， s，ψ'rano飽 4，at473創叫 PUBUCLAW AND HUMAN 
RtGHTS， supra note 8， at217. See also publishωUniversity of Ho噌 KongFaculty of Law Seminar 
Proceedings on the BilI of Rights; BILL OF RlGHTS BULLETlN (on file with author). 
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neither conflicted with the Basic Law nor had the superior status the Chinese 
claimed，17出ePRC government in February 1997 repealed three sections of 
the Bil of Rights18 on the grounds that they were inconsistent with the Basic 
Law.19 
Such seemingly arbitrary action， together with the very different 
conception of rights obtaining in出ePRC， raised concerns that the PRC 
might limit the protection of rights in Hong Kong， after July 1. Even the 
application of the ICCPR and ICECR raised questions， as the PRC denied 
it had any obligation to continue reporting under the two international rights 
covenants. On the eve of the hahdover， continued support for rights 
protection seemed problematic. To what extent have SAR and PRC actions 
after 1997 a百ectedthe protection of human rights in Hong Kong? What has 
happened since the July 1 transfer? 
11. RIGHTS UNDER THE HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT 
A. Business as Usual? 
The handover went smoothly and the SAR's new Chief Executive， 
Tung Chee-hwa， has been at pains since then to reassure foreign audiences 
as well as the residents of Hong Kong that al is“business as usual. ，20 
Indeed， it seems that no dramatic changes have occurred since July 1. 
Despite special concerns for the survival of freedom of the press， assembly 
17. See DECISION OFηmSTAND別GCOMMnTEE OF TIlE NA TIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS ON TREA TMENT 
OF叩 ELAWS PREVIOUSLY IN FORCE lN HONG KONG IN ACCORDANCE WITII ARTICLE 1ωOFTIlE 
BASIC LAW OF TIlE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF TIlE PEOPLE'S REpUBLlC OF 
CHINA (1997)， [hereinafter DEClSION OF TIlE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESSJ， reprinted in GHAI， 
supra note 4， at499-503. 
18. See GHAI， supra note 4， at499-503. 
19. The decision provided血atsections 2(3)， 3 and 4 of the BiI of Rights were not ωbe adopted as曲E
laws of the SAR. Sections 3 and 4 provide for rules of construction:出atal legislation predating 
the BiI of Rights should be given a construction consistent wi出 it，but if not， it is to be repealed 
to the extent of that inconsistency; and山atlegisla!ion adopted after the BiI of Rights should be 
construωconsistently wi自由eICCPR. See Hong Kong BiI of Righ岱 Ordinance，LAWS OFHONG 
KONG， ch. 383， ~~ 3， 4;see generalかGHAI，supra note 4， at499-503. Section 2(3) requires白紙
in interpreting the BiI of Rights“regard shal 恥 hadto曲efact白紙出epuゅoseof this Ordinance 
is to provide for the incorporation into the law of Hong Kong" the provisions of出eICCPR. Hong 
Kong BiI of Rights Ordinance， LAWS OF HONG KONG， ch. 383， ~ 2(3). 
20. Edward A. Gargan， Change in Hong Kong is Slow but Sure， N.Y. TIMES (lnternational)， Oct. 9， 
1997， atA10; David E. Sanger， Hong Kong's New Leader Disputes U.S. on Rights， N.Y. T制民
(lnternational)， Sept. 10， 1997， atA8. 
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and association，21 many protests and demonstrations have taken place since 
the handover. 22 Additionally， human rights groups have continued to operate 
and no political opponents have been arrested. 
Nevertheless， the official tone set by the chief executive with respect 
to rights is very different from that of his predecessor， Governor Patten. 
Overall， Mr. Tung has preferred to emph部 izeorder and stability. In August 
1997， he publicly expressed his support for “Asian values" and endorsed 
suggestions白紙 theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights was in need of 
review (and possible revision) to allow more input from developing 
countries.23 In October 1997， inhis first policy address， the chief executive 
paid scant attention to rights， downplaying their importance. According to 
one calculation， for example， he allotted only twenty-three seconds to 
freedom of the press.24 Although much of his speech was devoted to social 
issues， particularly education， housing and care for the elderly， his proposals 
were cast in the form of remedial measures， not as economic or social 
rights.2S 
Recent incidents， moreover， suggest that the Hong Kong government 
is now less open to press scrutiny， atleast from local journalists. Shortly 
after the handover， the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) expressed 
concern血atthe SAR government was granting special privileges to 
representatives from Chinese state media covering local Hong Kong events戸
More recently， a secret government memorandum containing instructions on 
how to“kil" a survey， launched by the HKJA to test open government 
2幻1. See general，均砂{かYLAWYERSCOω恥側r口πmτT苗 FORHUMANRぬE悶GωH町f口τ古&HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR， 
T1GHTEND判明ELEASH (1997); AMN首 TYINTERNATIONAL， HONG KONG-HUMAN RIGHTS， LAW AND 
AUTONOMY: THE RISKS OF TRANSITION (1997). 
22. Aωo吋mgωsome問 ports，more than 2∞protes匂 tookplace wi山in出巴 firstfew months after the 
haOOover. See Emily Lau， Must Hear More From Democracy Lobbyists， S.CHINA MORNING POST， 
Oct. 13， 1997， at18; see， e.g.， Robert Ng， Qiao Protesters Try to Storm Barricades， S. CHINA 
MORNINGPO釘， Feb. 12， 1998， at1. 
23. Echoing Prime Minister Mahathir ofMalaysia， Mr. Tung s胞飽d:“I'msympa血eticω血isargument. 
1 really am." Time to Clumge UN Human Rights Declaration，初 sTung， S. CHINA MORNING 
PO釘， Aug. 29， 1997， at6; Keith B. Richburg，lt's Business ωUs凶 1，Tung Quietly Tels U.S.， 
I附 'LHE臥 LDTRIa.， Aug. 28， 1997， at4. 
24. Pro叫democracypoliticians criticized him for omitting any mention of civil liberties and human 
rights. Lau， supra note 22， at18. AωordingωMartin Lee，“He didn't even mention a wo吋 about
freedom. " Kei白 B.Richburg， IωDays ofChinese Rule， WASH. PO訂， Oct. 9，ゆ97，at A25 
(quoting Lee). 
25. See Andy Ho， Building on Prosperity， but Locking Fo.抑制ions的 Freedom，S. CHINA MORNING 
POST， Oct. 9， 1997， at1 (Policy Address 97); Angela Li & Rodger Lee， Manin Lee Chides Neglect 
of Freedom， S.CH削AMoRN町GPOST， Oct. 9， 1997， at1 (Policy Address 1997); Kei出 Richburg，
Hong Kong's Leader Looks Ahead， INT'LHERALDTRIa.， Oct. 9，1997， at10. 
26. See Jimmy Cheung， Joumalists Wor，η Over “'Privileges. for Mainland Media， HONG KONG 
STANDARD， July 18， 1997， at4. 
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claims， caused an uproar when it was leaked to出epress.27 Even more 
ominous is the perceived threat to the independence of Radio Television 
Hong Kong (RTHK) after a Hong Kong member of a PRC body launched 
an attack on the government-run station for failing to promote government 
policy and suggested that the chief executive should exercise firmer control 
over it. Although political and professional bodies defended RTHK and 
argued for its continued autonomy， many interpreted Mr. Tung's lukewarm 
response as a first step towards control over the government-supported 
media.28 
Freedom of血epress was already a source of concern even before the 
handover， although the degree of self-censorship is hard to gauge. Since 
1995 criticism of the PRC government has often been muted， but the 
situation has not noticeably worsened and no oficial restraints have been 
placed on the press.29 The Hong Kong press has in fact been extremely 
critical of the SAR government， particularly for its handling of the of the 
late-1997 bird flu crisis and more generally for some of its actions on the 
economic front. 30 
How far self-censorship might carry over to other businesses in the 
SAR is even les certain， and public reaction has so far limited its spread. 
Several films血atChina found displeasing apparently could not be shown in 
出eSAR， but more recent reports suggest血atat least one found a distributor 
wi1ling to screen it. 31 In a bizarre incident， a major Hong Kong hotel issued 
booking guidelines banning the discussion of human rights and politics on its 
27. See Secret Memo on How to Deceive Joumalists (Jan 7， 1998) <hknews@ahkcus.org> (on file 
with author). 
28. See， e.g.， No Kwai-Yan， Who's Your Real Boss， Critic Xu Asks RTHK， S.CHINA MORNING POST 
(Mar. 7， 1998) <http://www.scmp.comlnews>; Carmen Cheung & Cynthia Wan， Tsui lnviting 
Mainland Jnteφrence with RTHK Criticism Says Chan， HONG KONG STANDARD (Mar. 6， 1998) 
< http://www.hkstandard.∞m>; Edmond Tong， Democrats Slam Tsui 's Anack on Rl刃K，HONG
KONG STANDARD <h即:lIwww.hkstanda凶.com>;Margaret Ng， Slow Road to Censorship， S.
CHINA MORNING PO訂 (Mar.6， 1998) <htゆ:lIwww.scmp.comlnews>;Linda Choy and Chris 
Yeung， Tung 伽 rksRTHK Autonomy Fears， S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 5， 1998) 
<h即:llwww.scmp.comlnews>.
29. See Philip Bowring，附at'sChanging in Hong Kong， INT'L HERALD TRIB.， Aug. 27， 1998， at8. 
30. 百 eHo曙 KOI司gpress has民en脱出melycritical of白egovernment's handling of血ebird flu crisis， 
al白ough伽 tis arguably more a reflection of出egeneral mood of白ecommu凶ty. See Taking 
αarge， S. CHINA MORNING POST (International)， Jan. 10， 1998， at10; Keith B. Richburg， Hong 
Kong Faulted on Handling of "Bird Flu' Crisis， WASH. PO灯， Jan. 4， 1998， atA17. 
31. But as of this writing none had yet appeared at a Hong Kong cinema. See Glenn Schloss & Gren 
Manuel，“'Anti-China' Films Set for Cinemas.・S.CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 4， 1997) 
<h即:lIwww.scmp.comlnews>;G1ennSchloss.BeijingPledges Hollywood Anti-China FU附白n
Be Screened， SUNDA y MORN別GPOST， Jan. 1， 1998， at5; Simon Buerk， Controversial Movie Man 
Puts“山'0Systems" to Test， S.CHINA MORNING POST (International)， Jan. 31， 1998， at6.百 e
filrns are “Red Comer，"“Seven Years in Tibet" and “Kundun." 
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premises. When leaked to the press， the guidelines caused an uproar， and 
由ehotel announced that it was dropping them (while maintaining it was 
simply trying to protect its guests).32 
B. Restrictive Legislation 
More impoはant出ansuch changes in tone， the HKSAR government has 
already introduced legislation restricting， or further reducing， rights 
promised by pre・handoverlaws.3 The provisional legislature， the body 
handpicked to replace the pre幽 handoverLegislative Council until elections 
are held for the first re思darlegislature， has amended both the Public Order 
Ordinance and the Societies Ordinance. The two ordinances hadbeen 
revised in 1991 to bring them into line with the Bil of Rights (and thus血e
ICCPR)， but China opposed the changes and in February 1997 repealed 
“major amendments" to those laws (along with the three sections it objected 
to in the Bil of Rights).34 
百lenew versions of the two ordinances were adopted after a period of 
consultation in Hong Kong， and strong public protests resulted in fewer 
restrictions in the enacted versions than in the originally proposed form.3S 
As a result of these amendments， however， simple notification of one's 
intentions to demonstrate is no longer sufficient. Groups now need ac加al
permission from the police to organize a protest， but permission may be 
denied in the interests of“national security." Before the amendments， 
societies were only required to noti町thegovernment of their formation to 
have legal existence. Now， the government may deny registration to a 
society， with national security again a grounds for denial of registration.百le
amended Societies Ordinance also bans local societies deemed to be 
“political organizations" from receiving foreign funding or establishing links 
with foreign political organizations.36 
Shortly after these amendments went into effect， the Hong Kong 
Security Bureau issued new police guidelines， ostensibly to help police apply 
32. See Niall Fraser， Furama Drops Ban on Politics and Human Rights Conferences (Dec. 3， 1997) 
<hknews@ahkcus.org> (on file with au出or).
3. Democrauc Party leader Martin Lee called血is出e“slowsqueeze." See Martin Lee， 1he Slow 
Squeel.e on Hong Kong， WASH. POST， Sept. 12， 1997， atA25. 
34. See generally DECISION 01' rnE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS， supra note 17. 
35. See Edward A. Gargan， Hong Kong's Government-to・BeGives a Bit on Rights Cutbacks， N.Y. 
T削 ES(lnte口Illtional)，May 16，1997， atAlO. 
36. See Cecilia So & Michael Smith， Outrage as PLC Passes Order Law， HONG KONG SrANDARD， June 
15， 1997， at1; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH， HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REP. 1998， at181-82 
(1998) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REp. 1998]. 
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the concept of national security as defined by the revised Public Order and 
Societies Ordinances. The guidelines list advocacy of independence for 
Taiwan and Tibet as grounds for refusing permission to demonstrate; the 
po1ice would also be able to refuse， or cancel， the registration of societies 
believed to be a risk to national security. 37 The police guide1ines were 
opposed by human rights groups， which have also called for curbs on the 
po1ice after a series of “shocking incidents of abuse. ，38 
In July 1997， the provisionallegislature also suspended three labor laws 
由atgranted trade unions the right to bargain collectively and to use funds for 
. po1itical pu中oses，and that prohibited anti-trade union discrimination.39 
Although those ordinances had been adopted to bring Hong Kong into line 
with internationallabor covenants， the provisionallegislature， without any 
public consultation， repealed the legislation relating to collective bargaining 
and anti-union discrimination later in 1997.40 
More recent1y， in February 1998 the provisional legislature voted， 
despite objections from both the Law Society and the Bar Association，41 as 
well as human rights groups，42 to repeal an amendment to the Bil of Rights， 
which was passed by the now disbanded Legislative Council just before the 
July 1 handover. The Bil of Rights (Amendment) Ordinance 1997 was 
enacted to correct a Hong Kong court decision43 holding that legislation 
repealed under the Bil of Rights was repealed only insofar as it applied to 
the government or public authorities， but not as between private persons. 
The amendment therefore provided only that once legislation is repealed by 
the Bil of Rights， it is repealed altogether， with respect to al parties.44 
In J uly 1997， the provisional legislature suspended the Bil of Rights 
amendment (along with the labor ordinances discussed above) until earlier 
37. See Stela Lee & Angela Li， Securi，ηBan on Freedom Rallies， S.CHINA MORNING POST， July 19， 
1997， at1; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1998， supra note 36， at181. 
38. Jane Moir & Billy Wong Wai・Yuk，Callfor Curbs on Police Powers， S.CHlNA MORNING POST 
(Intemational)， Nov. 15， 1997. 
39. See Lucia Palpal-Iaωc， Unions to Fight Law Ban仇 Court，HONG KONG STANDARD， July 18， 1997， 
at4. 
40. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1998， supra note 36， at181-82. 
41. See Genevieve Ku， Lawyers Seek De均 onBiI of Rights Changes， S.CHINA MORNING POST， Feb. 
7， 1998， at6. 
42. See Angela Li， Monitor Issues陥 rningon RなhtsBil， S.CHINA MORNING PO釘 (Feb.25， 1998) 
<h即:lIwww.scmp.com/news>;Jimmy Cheung， Vote Overturns Amendments to Bil of Rights， 
S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 26， 1998) <http://www.scmp.com/news>. 
43. See Tam Hing-yee v. Wu Tai-wai， [1992] 1 H.K.L.R. 185 (Ct. App.). 
4. See Margaret Ng， Wrong W.のonRights， S.CHINA MORNING POST， Jan. 23， 1998， at21. 
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出isyear. 45 The SAR government argued that the amendment made the Bill 
of Rights binding on private persons as well as on government authorities， 
which would lead to a substantial increase in litigation and place an 
“unnecessary legal burden" on the pub1ic. 46 Suspension-and ultimately， 
repeal-of the pre・handoveramendment was therefore essential in order to 
remove the law's“uncertainties and confusion."の Infact， however， the 
amendment would have had a much more limited effect， and government 
critics have characterized the official statements as misleading. 48 
It seems unlikely that血enext SAR legislature will prove more sensitive 
to human rights issues or sympa曲目icto legislation intended to protect rights 
than the provisionallegislature has shown itself to be. In August 1997 the 
provisional legislature adopted legislation establishing the new system for 
“elections" to出eSAR's first regular Legislative Council， now scheduled for 
May 1998.百lenew scheme substantially reduces the franchise for the thirty 
functional constituency seats (from 2.7 million under the 1995 electoral 
system to 180，000)グandintroduces a system of propo目ionalrepresentation 
for the twenty geographical constituencies (which were directly elected in 
1995 on the basis of one person， one vote). As a result， the revised election 
system will clearly favor business interests and reduce the number of seats 
held by representatives of the pro-democracy groups.50 Since the 1991 and 
1995 electoral systems， both of which broadened the franchise， were found 
45. See Government Mum on Righls Bil (Dec. 23， 1997) <hknews@ahkcus.org> (on file with 
author); May Sin-Mi Hon， lnterim BodyωWeigh Sheaf of Bills B売foreFacing Disbandment， S. 
CH別AMORNING POST， Dec. 26， 1卯7，a14; Linda Choy， Lawyer Deplores Bill of Righls Rollback， 
S. CHINA MORNING POST， July 18， 1997， at4. 
46. Margaret Ng， supra note 44. 
47. Government 10 Scrap Righls Clause (Jan. 17， 1998) <hknews@ahkcus.org> (on file w凶 au血or).
48. The SAR governrnent was also crilicized for the timing of the consideration and repeal of出e
amendment; after the visil the Chief Secretary of Administration made to the U. S.， in order to 
avoid questions 0目白erepeal. See Andy Ho， Into Ihe Lions' Den， S. CHINA MORNING POST， Dec. 
23， 1997， at19. 
49. See Margarel Ng， Execulive's Cloak of Legality， S.CHINA MORNING POST， Aug. 22， 1997， at19; 
Danny Gittings， Relurn 10 Ihe Bad Old Days， S. CHINA MORNING POST， Aug. 17， 1997， at10. 
Under出eBasic Law， no more伽 n12 of the 10凶 ofωse山 maygo to foreign passpon holders; 
由eSAR allocaled them al 10 the functional constituency seals， with none for the directly-elected 
seats-which wil bar some candidates unless出eyrenounce their citizenship. See Fanny Wong， Poll 
Task Besel by Problems， S.CH削AMoRN別GPOST， Aug. 19， 1997， at19. Under the arrangements 
for the geographical constituency seats， the Democratic Pany calculated it would have 10 win 65 % 
。f出epopular vot巴10win 25% of出eseats. See Chris Yeung & May Sin-Mi Hon， U.S. Official 
Told of “'Lasl Righls and Sham Poll， S. CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 6， 1997) 
< http://www.scmp.comlnew > . 
50. See Margaret Ng， We don'l need Judge Pao， S. CHINA MORNING POST， Sept. 5， 1997， at27. 
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inconsistent with the provisions of the ICCPR， there is litle doubt the new 
system will be similarly viewed.51 
Despite the absence of any dramatic crackdown since July 1， the SAR 
government has出usenacted legislation that significantly departs from the 
international standards stil applying to Hong Kong. The emphasis on 
“executive-Ied government" has also contributed， atleast indirectly， to an 
erosion of rights， as matters previously viewed as rights or entitlements have 
become a matter of discretion for the chief executive. Although he has 
suggested白紙 theSAR government would give priority to economic and 
social rights， many Hong Kong people see themselves as worse off than in 
the past， with the government failing to pay sufficient attention to their 
economic welfare. S2 Consequently， intheir first six-month assessment of出e
SAR， Hong Kong human rights groups strongly criticized the government for 
its failure to support both political and economic rights in the territory-and 
a former legislator labeled the SAR government “more high-handed" than 
its colonial predecessor. S3 
IV. ACTIONS OF THE PRC GOVERNMENT 
A. The ICCPR and the ICESCR in Hong Kong 
Consideration of the PRC government's actions since July 1 produces 
a very di百erentpicture: apparent support for， and increased protection of， 
rights， instead of their limitation. Despite concern出atChinese interference 
would lead to a curtailment of rights in Hong Kong after 1997， the Chinese 
au血oritieshave repeatedly affirmed their official policy of non-interference 
in the affairs of the SAR， S4 and so far at least their actions do not openly 
51. See Editorial， 4 BILL OF RTS. BULL. 5 (Aug. 1997). 
52. See Shir1ey Kwok， One in 7 Survive on Less 1nan $90 a Dの， S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 8， 
1997) <http://www.scmp.comlnews>. Government statistics show白紙出egap between rich and 
poor in Hong Kong has widened over恥 lastdecade. See Poor Left Behindωlncome Gap Grows， 
S.CH刑AMoRN別GP町 r(Intemational)， Dec. 13， 1997， at3; Lau Siu却し SocialMalaise on Rise 
ω Values Abandoned， S. CHINA MORNING PO釘(International)，]an. 17， 1998， at6. 
53. Oliver Poole， Rights Being 19nored， say Protestors， S. CHINA MORNING POST， Dec. 1， 1997， at
6. Human rights activists rnaintained出atat least six policies of山eSAR government contravened 
白eUniversal Declaration of Hurnan Rights， most of them relating to socia1 and economic policies. 
See Sharon Cheung， Tung“Tums Deaf Ear"ωPublic， S. CHINA MORNING POST (]an. 2， 1998) 
< http://www.scmp.comlnews > . 
54. For example， inthe問 centsta包me目白 by白enNational People's Congress chairman Qiao Shi on a 
February visit to the SAR. See Chris Yeung & No Kwai・Yan，Beijing 5oti，ポedwith SAR Rule， 
Qiao Tels Tung， S. CHINA MORNING POST， Feb. 12， 1998， at1. 
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contradict that stance.s Since July 1， moreover， the Chinese have taken a 
series of positive steps towards the implementation of the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR in the SAR. 
Under heavy pressure since 1989 to rati命thetwo main intemational 
human rights covenants，56 the Chinese finally signed the ICESCR in late 
October 1997.57 PRC spokesmen made clear that the ICESCR would stil be 
subject to“study" and ratification before it could be implemented in China， 
but some reports predicted the covenant could be sent to the National 
People's Congress for ratification as early as its March 1998 meeting.S8 
Furthermore， according to Chinese President Jiang Zemin， the PRC is “now 
seriously considering the signing" of the second covenant， the ICCPR.59 It 
will not be eぉyfor China to resolve cont1icts between the provisions of the 
ICCPR and its domestic legislation， so a double ratification is unlikely in出e
near fu加re.But the PRC has taken an important prelirninary step， one血at
should make it easier for the substance of the two covenants to be applied in 
Hong Kong， as the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law require. 
In a second important move， the PRC formally assured U.N. officials 
that under the “one country， two systems" policy it would allow the 
application of the ICCPR and the ICESCR to Hong Kong， and血atit would 
be prepared to submit reports to the U.N. Committees on Hong Kong's 
behalf， even though China is not a state party60 to either of the covenants.61 
Although the reports would be submitted to the U.N. Committees via the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry， the HKSAR government would prepare出eactual 
55. The first study on the SAR's political status carried out by a congressional task force praised 
China' s apparent lack of interferenωinHo略 Kong'sa仔'airs.See Simon Beck，“SoFar. So Gりod"
Transition Verdict， SUNDAY MORNING POST， Nov. 23， 1997， at2. 
56.τbe PRC had promised ωsign， or iI討icatedit was about to do so， on a number of occasions. For 
example， inApril 1997， China announced it would sign白eICESCR before the end of 1997. See 
Hong Kong Rights Group Skeptical on China Move， REUTERS WORLD SERVICE， Apr. 8， 1997， 
available仰 L回 IS，News Library， Reuwld File; Protect時 Rゆ 's，S. CHINA Mo剛 INGPO釘， Apr. 
12， 1997， at16. 
57. See Tom Korsky & Simon Beck， Beijing Signs but Stals on Fulfiling UN Rights Covenant， S. 
CHlNA MORNING POST (International)， Nov. 1， 1997， at1. 
58. See Jona出anBraude， Beijing "Willing to Ratify Rights Covenant." S. CHINA MORNING PO釘， Jan. 
25， 1998， at6. 
59. China Weighs Signing Hw脚 tRights Accord， AAP lNFo.4 SERVS. L'叩.， AAP NEWSFEED， Jan. 15， 
1998， available in LEXIS， News Library， Aapnew File. 
ω. State pa凶esto血eICCPR undertake to submit reports to the Hurnan Rights Committee on曲e
measures白eyhave adop也dωgiveeffectωrights provided for in the covenant. See 999 U.N.T.S. 
art. 40. Article 16 of出eICESCR provides for a similar undertaking. See 993 U.N.T.S. aは.16. 
61. See U.N. Pleased with Rights Policies in Hong Kong， CHINA DAILY， Dec. 1， 1997， at1. Chris 
Yeung， Beijing Vow on Rights Repons， S. CHINA MORNING POST (International)， Nov. 29， 1997， 
at 1. 
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reports (they would be “mainly written" by Hong Kong officials)， and Hong 
Kong officials would be permitted to speak on behalf of the Chinese 
delegation at the U.N.62 
B. Significance of the Hong Kong Reporting 
In most countries litle importance may be attached to reports mandated 
by the ICCPR or the ICESCR (few people read or critique them)， but in 
Hong Kong， the reporting process played a very significant role during the 
decade before the handover. Although Britain's first report on the 
implementation of the ICCPR in Hong Kong， which was submitted in 1978 
as part of a longer repo口onits dependent territories， did not generate much 
local interest， the U.N. Human Rights Committee began raising questions on 
human rights issues in the territory. 63 The second periodic report， submitted 
(five years late) in 1988， attracted much more attention. By then Britain had 
agreed under the Joint Declaration to return Hong Kong to China， a country 
that had not ratified either of the two covenants.64 
The two most recent periodic reports (both submitted after June 4， 
1989) were widely distributed， reported in the press and subjected to 
extensive local criticism.6S Issues relating to the reports were raised in the 
Legislative Council. Local， as well as international， Non-Governmental 
Organizations submitted rebuttals66 and sent representatives to testify in 
Geneva， and proceedings before the Human Rights Committee were closely 
followed in Hong Kong.67 Although more attention was directed towards the 
62. See No Kwai-Yan & Genevieve Ku， Beijing Puts U.N. Human Rights Reports in H.ω油ザLocal
Oficials， S.CHlNA MORNING POST， Nov. 25， 1卯7，at 6. 
63. Nihal Jayawickrama， Hong Kong and the International Protection 01 Human Rights， inHUMAN 
RIG町 'SIN HONG KONG， 120， 134-5 (Raymond Wacks ed.， 1992). 8ritain submitted a to凶 offour 
periodic reports (1978， 1988， 1991 and 1995) to the Human Rights Committee along wi出 aseries 
of supplementary reports.百lefma¥ report was submitted at the request of the Committee in 1997， 
ωcover the h凶nanrigh岱 situationin Hong Kong up to June 30， 1997. See 4 8ILL OF RTS. 8ULL. 
62 (Aug. 1997). 
64. See Jayawickrama， supra no飽 63，at 136-37. 
65. See. e.g.， Angela Li. Rights Appeal to Britain. S. CHINA MORNING POST. Dec. 21， 1995， at2; 
Louis Won. Rights Report to U.N. Under Fire; Document 'FailsωReflect Concerns，' S. CHINA 
MORNING POST. June 7. 1996， at4. 
66. Hong Kong on the eve of the handover had an extremely active and lively range of NGOs. See 
George E. Edwards. Hong Kong: Preserving Human Rights and the Rule of Law. 12 AM. U. J. 
I附 'LL. & POL'Y 361， 408 (1997). 
67. See Emily Lau， United Front on Human Rights， S.CHINA MORNING POST， Oct. 16， 1995， at18; 
Chris Yeung， Solicitor-General CaUs For Candour On Rights， S.CHINA MORNING POST， Oct. 13， 
1995， at6; Linda Choy， U.N. To Be Lobbied Over Human Rights Report， S.CH削AMoRN酎GPO訂.
Oct. 21， 1996， at4; Angela Li， Rights AppealωBri・r仰， S.印刷AMORNINGPOST，Dec. 21，1995， 
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ICCPR reports， Britain also submitted reports on the implementation of the 
ICESCR， and these too drew criticism in the territory. 68 
During those years， human rights groups and the Human Rights 
Committee raised a broad spectrum of issues for comment and criticism. In 
the earlier sessions， for example， British representatives were asked to 
explain the continued existence of the death penalty， the use of co叩oral
punishment， immigration and police powers， and questionable provisions of 
the Official Secrets Act and the Public Order Ordinance.69 With later reports， 
the focus shifted to arrangements for the transition， inc1uding particularly the 
independence of the judiciary， composition of the court of final appeal， 
provisions of the Bil of Rights， anti-discrimination laws， police conduct， 
election arrangements and the provisional legislature， and freedom of 
assembly and association under the Public Order and Society Ordinances.70 
In al these critical areas，由eactions of both the British and Hong Kong 
governments were held up to scrutiny， not only within the territory but also 
in the international community， and their officials were pressed to account 
for perceived failures in implementing the covenants in Hong Kong. The 
reporting process provided Hong Kong people with an opportunity for 
participation not otherwise available to them and thereby spurred出e
development of rights consciousness in Hong Kong. The process also led to 
concrete results， as the Hong Kong government was pressured or shamed 
into the amendment or repeal of Hong Kong's most egregious restrictions on 
rights. 
C. China's Role inReporting 
An important issue in the run-up to 1997， therefore， was whether China 
would continue reporting on the implementation of the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR in Hong Kong after the territory's reversion， and if so， by what 
at 2. 
68. See Andrew Byrnes. Wil脚 GovemmentPut its Money附 ereits Moω'h Is? 1ne Verdict of the 
UN Committee on Economic， Social and Cultural Rights on Hong Kong 's Human Rights Record， 
25 H.K. L.J. 156 (1995). 
69. See Jayawickrama， supra note 63， at 136-37. 
70. See， e.g.， THE THIRD PERlODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN RESPECT OF ITS DEPENDENT 
TER則TO悶ESUNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE INTERNA TIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POunCAL RIGHTS 
(0ωber 1989)， reprinted加 PUBUcLAWANDHUMANRIGHTS， supra note 8， at 421; MARCH 1991 
UPDATE， reprinted in PUBUC LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS， supra note 8， at 437;τ'HE FINAL REPORT 
BY叩 EUNITED KING∞M OF GREAT BRJTAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IN RESPECT OF HONG KONG 
UNDER百m INTERNA TIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POunCAL RIGHTS， reprinted in 4 BILL OF RTS. 
BULL. 62 (Aug. 1997). 
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means. British officials argued that such reporting would stil be required， 
a view supported by human rights groups in Hong Kong and in the 
international community.百leU.N. Human Rights Committee upanimously 
t~ok the view that China was under an obligation to continue reporting， 
either under the Joint Declaration or as a matter of general international 
law.71 Some questions remained， including the manner of reporting and the 
jurisdiction of the U.N. committees to accept repoロsor complaints directly 
from Hong Kong in the absence of ratification by China， but the Human 
Rights Committee indicated its willingness to be flexible. 72 The Committee 
on Economic， Social and Cultural Rights adopted a similar stance， suggesting 
(if les strongly)白紙 reportingshould be continued after出e1997 transition， 
and it too expressed its willingness to receive reports.73 
Human rights experts argued血atChina had undertaken procedural as 
well as substantive obligations with respect to the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
when it promised in the Joint Declaration that the provisions of the two 
conventions“as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force." To ensure 
出atthe covenants remained in force after 1997， China would have to 
continue the reports. 74 Suppo口ersof reporting also relied on the theory of 
state succession， under which human rights treaties devolve with territory; 
once human rights treaties have entered into force in a territory， they must 
survive any change in sovereignty. Under either argument， China would be 
obligated to continue the reporting， regardless of whether China was a state 
pa口y.75
But China's position was problematic; at least during the 1990s， the 
PRC repeatedly denied白紙 itwas under 'any obligation to continue reporting 
to the U.N. committees. Since it was not a state party to either covenant， the 
PRC argued that it could not be bound to prepare or submit such reports. 
Moreover， ifHong Kong wished to continue the process on its own， it was 
71. See Johannes Chan， StOle Succession to Human Rights TreOlies;・HongKong and the /nternational 
白 venanton Civil and Political Rights， 45 INT・LCOMP，L.Q. 928， 934 (間話).The Human Rights 
Committee requesled that Britain submit a supplementary repoロin1996 to report on developments 
relating ωreporting mechanisms， See Christine Loh， Human Rights-ln a Ti目'me1ぬrp?，in THE 
OTHER HONG KONG REPORT 1996， at107 (Nyaw Mee-kau & Li Si-ming eds.， 1996). 
72. See Frank Ching， U.N. Speaks Out on Hong Kong. Human-Rights Panel Asks for Reports on 
Territory After 15砂7，FARE. ECON， REV.， Nov. 23， 1995， at40; Chan， supra note 71， at939-40. 
73. See Bymes， sψra note 68. 
74. 百 emeaning of肱 phrases“S凶 Irernain in force" and "as applied to Hong Kong" were白 subj削
of disagreement. See Chan， supra no旬 71，at 928. 
75. See Nihal Jayawickrama， Human Rights in Hong Kong;・ 1heContinued Applicability of the 
/nternational Covenants， 25 H.K. L.J 171， 172-73 (1995); Chan， supra note 71， at928-38 
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not clear白紙 Chinawould al10w the HKSAR government to do so戸 Asa
result， the issue was debated in Hong Kong with some feeling， plenty of ink 
was spilled on the topic， and China's steadfast refusal to commit itself to 
continue出ereporting caused great anxiety in由erun-up to 1997. 
D. Unresolved Issues 
China' s announcement血atit would continue the reporting was 
therefore greeted with relief in Hong Kong， but several issues have yet to be 
resolved， including the actual timing of submissions. According to one 
source， Beijing is expectedωsubmit the repo此son behalf of Hong Kong to 
the two U.N. committees in August， but Hong Kong officials could not 
confirm it. 77 A more出lpO此antissue is the extent to which Hong Kong 
people will be consulted on the dra世間portsthe SAR government prepares. 
Human rights groups in Hong Kong have called for public consultation 
before the reports are finalized，78 and broader consultation would ensure a 
more accurate submission. Although SAR spokesmen have promised 
consultation， it appears血at出ereports will not be released before being sent 
to Beijing， and only the final versions will be published.79 
Finally， it is not clear whether the Chinese government will submit the 
r問ep卯o此巾s邸 d命raft負e吋db句y血eSARo町rin凶I凶sistはo佃n泊凶t住roωdu叫c泊gi泊岱 owna創mend伽lent岱S.ω 
The PRC has r問eft白IS問edt旬ocommit江ts印el旺f，y8創Iinsisting that revisions are an 
76. See S. Y. Yue， H.K. Rights Report to UN Delayed by Britain， S.CHINA MORNING POST， Oct. 31， 
1994， at3; David Wallen， UN初 PledgeforFreedoms， S.CHINA MORNING POST， Oct. 19， 1朔，
at 4; Move to Ease Concem Over Human Rights， S.CHINA MORNING POST， Nov. 16， 1995， at4; 
Emily Lau， Breaking a Promise on Rights Covenants， S.CHINA MORNING POST， 1uly 8， 1996， at
18. 
7. See Li; supra note 42. A spokesman for the Home Affairs Bureau had heard of no such 
development. 
78. See Chris Yeung， Public lnput Plea Over UN Rights Reports， S.CHINA MORNING PO釘， Nov. 23， 
1卯 7，at 2. 
79. See May Sin-Mi Hon， Fears Over Fate ~同4RRights SI仰の， S. CHINA MORNING POST， 1an. 25， 
1998， at 2. The recently prepared report on出eConvention on the Elimination of al forms of 
Discrimination Aga，附 tWomenallowω“consultatio砕-but白紙ωokthe form of headings announced 
ωthe public， who ∞uld釦b凶tcomments under those headings. No Kwai-Yan & Genevieve Ku， 
Beijing Puts UN Hun肌 Rゆ 'sReports in Hands of Local (事仰仏 S.印刷AMo附削GP，聞， Nov. 
25， 1997， at6. 
80. U.K. Puts Faith飢 PollBωか(Dec.2， 1997) <hknews@ahkcus.org> (on file wi出 au曲or);May 
Sin-Mi Ho， Fears Over Fate ~何4RRights Stuの， S. CHINA MORNING POST， 1an. 25， 1998， at2. 
81. See No Kwai-Yan， Beijing Cautio，ωon Rights Reports， S.CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 4， 1抑 7)
< http://www.scmp.comlnews > . 
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internal matter for China.82 In the event， this will prove a crucial test of 
China's good faith.83 For China's decision to continue the reporting process 
raises a larger issue: does it represent a lasting commitment to 
implementation of the covenants in Hong Kong or is it simply a policy shift 
to deflect criticism? China formally announced a “policy decision" to allow 
the two covenants to remain in force in Hong Kong， not a recognition of the 
PRC's obligations (whether under the Joint Oeclaration or general 
internationallaw) to do SO.84 China's stance may only reflect its position血at
it could not be bound to repoロuntilits own ratification of the ICCPR and 
ICESCR.おThePRC has always viewed it as a question of sovereignty and 
may well have announced its willingness to comply only when it could no 
longer appear to be under pressure from the British.86 But policy in China 
can and does change frequently. At the moment it is in China's interest to 
allow the reporting to continue， but if出atchanged， the policy could also be 
reversed， particularly in the still-sensitive area of human rights.87 It is 
unlikely白紙 Chinawould openly renege on its recent promises， but it could 
certainly interfere with the reports prepared by the HKSAR for submission 
to the UN or insist on revisions to its satisfaction. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the months since the July 1， 1997 handover， the PRC authorities 
have shi白edto a moderate policy towards Hong Kong， a sharp contrast to由e
final years of British rule， when they waged relentless press campaigns 
against the Hong Kong and British government and oficials.88 Now that the 
82. 明leissue was raised at白eDecember 1997 meetings of曲eSino・8ritishJoint Liaison Group， the 
first sessions held since the handover. but the Chinese refused to answer when 8ritish 
町民sentativesasked. See Frank C凶18，New Era for Britain andαina， FARE. ECON. REV.， Dec. 
18，1997， at80; U.K. P附 Faithin Poll Bαか(Dec.2， 1997) <地newS@討tkcus.org>(on ft1e wi出
au白or).
83. See Christine Lo， One Country， 1Wo Human Rights Reports， CHINA RTS. F.， Winter 1997-98， at
14-15. 
84. See. e.g.， UN Pleωed with Rights Policies 加 HongKong. CHINA DAILY， Dec. 1， 1997， at1. 
85. See Chan， supra note 71， at945. 
86. See Al to the Good， SUNDAY MORNING POST， Nov. 23，ω97， at10. 
87. Some commentaωrs have expressed skepticism at出esincerity of China's moves， arguing that血e
timing suggests attempωto avoid UN censur or carry out “charm offensives." See. e.g. Pe飽r
Humphrey， Hong Kong Rights Group Skeptical on China Move， REUTERS WORLD SERVICE， Apr. 
8， 1997， available in LEXIS， News Library， Reuworld File; Trevor Marshallsea， Charm Offensive 
Continues 1nrough Jiang's US Tour， AAP INFO. SERVS. LTD.， AAP NEWSFEED， Oct. 28， 1997， 
available in LEXIS， News Library， Aapnew File. 
8. See， e.g.， Ching， New Era， supra note 82. 
1998] Human Rights 323 
“bad marriage" with Britain is over and the bitter quarrels of the transition 
period are safely past， China has also apparently reversed its policies on 
some individual issues， finally agreeing to continue reporting for Hong Kong 
under the ICCPR and ICESCR. These actions constitute positive steps for 
出eprotection of rights in Hong Kong-and seemingly contradict the actions 
of the SAR government， now so intent on introducing legal restrictions to 
limit rights in the territory. 
But is there really such a contradiction between Chinese and SAR 
policies on rights? With a handpicked legislature and chief executive in the 
SAR to do their bidding， Chinese officials need no longer pursue their 
former hard line.89 From the PRC point of view， the Bil of Rights has been 
neutralized， Chinese ideas of national or state security are being introduced， 
whether formal1y or informal1y， into the SAR， and those who are not 
“patriotic" have been ousted from the legislature， with litle chance of 
retuming under new (and carefully designed) election rules. 
Under these circumstances， intemational human rights law .must stil 
provide the concrete standards against which to measure the SAR's 
performance， as well as intemational supervision for the performance of 
China's obligations under the covenants.90 The reporting process to the U.N. 
human rights committees remains a key to血atprotection， providing the only 
avenue for Hong Kong people (now increasingly shut out from political 
participation or consultation) to bring complaints or cal attention to abuses 
in Hong Kong in an intemational forum.91 Although the U.N. committees 
cannot force either the PRC or出eHKSAR to take action， they can hold the 
actions of both governments up to intemational scrutiny and criticism. 
China's apparent non-interference in the affairs of the SAR and its 
recent moves towards recognition of the intemational human rights regime 
do deserve credit. But the restrictive legislation introduced by the SAR 
goveriunent itself and the possibility of fu加re，les benevolent policy shifts 
89. This is certainly the view of opposition critics. See Sharon Cheung， Chiザ“Fai/sto Deliver， " S. 
CH1NA MORN1NG POST， Dec. 30， 1997， at4. 百lechief executive has also been criticized for 
supporting Beijing's positions ou臼idemaners rela~ωωHong Ko略・ DannyGinings， Ins and OU1s 
ザLeadership，S. CH酎AMORN1NG POST， Dec. 28， 1997， at8. A recent U.S. Co略 ressre附 also
suggested白紙 HongKong may be quietly doing B刊ing'sbiddin嘩forfear of upsetting the PRC. 
See Sirnon Beck， SAR“May Be Quietly Toeing the μne，" S. CHINA MORN別GPOST (Feb. 28， 1998) 
<http://www.scmp.com/new>. 
90. See Jayawickrama， supra note 63， at134. 
91. See RODA MUSHKAT， ONE COUNTRY， Two INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALlTlES:百mCASEOF
HONG KONG， 126-29 (1997). Human Rights Monitor and other Hong Kong human rights groups 
have already threatenedωraise血erepeal of the BiI of Righ臼 amendm巴ntat the UN Commission 
on Human Rights meeting in March-April 1998. See Li， supra note 42; Cheung， supra note 42. 
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on China' s part mean白紙 theseissues cannot be ignored. Double 
ratification by the PRC of the two intemational rights covenants would of 
course remove many difficulties relating to their implementation in Hong 
Kong. In the meantime， intemational rights covenants-and their reporting 
procedures-still have a particularly important role to play in protecting 
human rights in Hong Kong， just as they did before July 1， 1997. 
